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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 10-4192 
_______________ 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MADELINE WRIGHT, 
 
       Appellant 
 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-10-cr-00320-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Stanley R. Chesler 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 18, 2011 
_______________ 
 
Before:  RENDELL, AMBRO, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 22, 2011 ) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Madeline Wright pled guilty to one count of wire fraud in May 2010.  The District 
Court for the District of New Jersey sentenced Wright in October of that year, and she 
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filed a timely notice of appeal.  Subsequently, Wright’s attorney moved to withdraw as 
counsel under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that all potential 
grounds for appeal are frivolous.  Wright has filed pro se briefs in support of her appeal.  
We grant her counsel’s Anders motion and affirm her sentence. 
I. 
 As a bookkeeper, Wright embezzled over $2.4 million from her employer.  The 
money came through about 120 wire transfers spanning nearly a decade.  To hide her 
transactions, she created at least 1,875 false entries in her employer’s accounting system.  
Untangling those entries has cost the employer $350,000. 
 Wright waived her right to an indictment by grand jury.  Instead, prosecutors 
issued an information charging her with one count of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1343.  Wright appeared before the District Court and, pursuant to a written plea 
agreement, pled guilty to that charge.  The Court conducted an adequate plea colloquy, 
which Wright does not challenge. 
 After a separate sentencing hearing, the District Court sentenced Wright to 60 
months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, restitution in the amount of 
$2,476,155, and a special assessment of $100. 
II. 
 Our rules provide that “[w]here, upon review of the district court record, counsel 
is persuaded that the appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit, counsel may file a 
motion to withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders.”  3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a).  
If we concur with counsel’s assessment, we “grant [the] Anders motion, and dispose of 
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the appeal without appointing new counsel.”  Id.  Accordingly, our “inquiry is . . . 
twofold: (1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled the rule’s requirements; and (2) whether 
an independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  United States v. 
Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 In his Anders brief, Wright’s attorney identified three potential grounds for appeal: 
(1) the District Court’s jurisdiction; (2) the validity of Wright’s guilty plea; and (3) the 
reasonableness of Wright’s sentence.  Our review of the record confirms counsel’s 
assessment that there are no nonfrivolous issues for direct appeal. 
 First, we agree that the District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
Second, we uphold the validity of Wright’s plea agreement.  The District Court 
conducted a thorough plea hearing complying with the standards set forth in Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.  At her plea 
hearing, Wright was advised of her rights and the consequences of pleading guilty.  The 
Court reviewed the wire fraud charge, the statutory maximum penalties, and Wright’s 
waiver of her right to a grand jury indictment.  It also complied with the specific colloquy 
requirements set out in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c), advising Wright of the 
federal trial rights that she waived by pleading guilty. 
 Third, Wright’s sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable.  The 
District Court properly conducted the sentencing hearing following the three-step process 
that we outlined in United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006).  District 
courts must calculate a defendant’s Sentencing Guidelines range, rule on any departure 
motions, and sentence based on the relevant factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  In this case, 
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the District Court properly calculated Wright’s Guidelines range of 51 to 63 months of 
imprisonment and considered factors raised by the parties, including Wright’s personal 
statements.  There were no departure motions.  In addition, the sentence itself was 
substantively reasonable in light of the facts to which Wright pled guilty. 
 In her pro se brief, Wright raises four particular objections to her sentence: (1) the 
application of the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction; (2) the application of the 
sophisticated-means enhancement; (3) the application of the abuse-of-position-of-trust 
enhancement; and (4) the District Court’s alleged failure to consider mitigating 
circumstances in its 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) analysis.  Wright did not raise these objections 
during sentencing, so we review her claims for plain error.  See United States v. Berry, 
553 F.3d 273, 279 (3d Cir. 2009).  She must show an error, it must be obvious, and it 
must affect a substantial right.  Id.  If all three conditions are met, we may then exercise 
our discretion to alter the sentence, “but only if . . . the error seriously affect[s] the 
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Id. (quoting Johnson v. 
United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997)). 
 First, Wright received the three-point downward adjustment for acceptance of 
responsibility that she seeks on appeal.  Contrary to her assertion, the presentence report, 
which the District Court adopted, provided the appropriate three-point adjustment, not 
merely a two-point adjustment.  
 Second, the sophisticated-means enhancement was appropriate.  The Guidelines 
call for the enhancement when there is “especially complex or especially intricate offense 
conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of an offense.”  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 
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cmt. n.8(B).  Here, Wright shuttled funds across various client accounts, on average 
creating 13 false entries per transaction to hide her fraud.  She changed her means as her 
employer implemented new control rules, allowing her to continue her scheme for eight 
and a half years.  That the fraud required only the skills and software that she would 
otherwise use in her job does not make it any less sophisticated.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Humber, 255 F.3d 1308, 1313-14 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Humber’s crime against the Bank 
involved continuous acts of fraud over a seven year basis. . . .  It took external auditors 
eight months to unravel, and[] the record reflects that the full extent of the crime may 
never be known.”). 
 Third, the District Court properly applied the abuse-of-position-of-trust 
enhancement.  Her position left her with enough discretion in reconciling accounts to 
perpetrate this fraud.  Such discretion is the hallmark of this enhancement.  See U.S.S.G. 
§ 3B1.3 cmt. n.1.  That she was not supervising other employees is not dispositive.  
Furthermore, the factors that guided our analysis in United States v. Thomas, 315 F.3d 
190 (3d Cir. 2002), support the District Court’s conclusion.  Wright’s “position allow[ed 
her] to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong,” as shown by the investment of time and 
money that it has taken to uncover it.  Id. at 204.  Her position gave her authority over the 
accounts.  Id.  By the time she was caught, she had been promoted to Senior Quality 
Control Analyst.  Finally, Wright’s employer “did not monitor [her] closely and appeared 
to rely on her judgment and integrity,” id., as she was able to embezzle money for almost 
a decade without anyone noticing. 
6 
 Fourth, the District Court properly considered the applicable § 3553(a) factors.  
For example, though Wright’s counsel insisted at sentencing that “my client has no 
intention of arguing her past or her history or her life experience,” the Court addressed 
those factors.  Despite its own investigation, in concert with the Probation Department, 
the Court could not corroborate Wright’s claims about her childhood.  It also reviewed 
character letters that she submitted, but the authors did not appear to know of the charges 
to which Wright had pled guilty.  Contrary to Wright’s suggestion, district courts are 
under no obligation to interview the authors of such letters.  Deterrence is an important 
factor, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), and Wright’s age alone does not make it irrelevant.  A 
defendant in her late 40s may be less likely to commit violent crimes, but fraud is 
different.  Indeed, Wright had taken a job as a bookkeeper at another company, offering 
her the opportunity to offend again.  The District Court’s conclusions do not constitute 
plain error. 
*    *    *    *    * 
 Wright’s counsel adequately fulfilled the requirements of Anders.  Because our 
independent review of the record fails to reveal any nonfrivolous ground for direct 
appeal, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm Wright’s sentence.1
                                              
1 Wright is hereby advised that should she wish to file before us a petition for rehearing, 
an original and 14 copies of a petition for rehearing en banc must be filed within 14 days 
of the entry of judgment, or, if that time has passed, she may promptly file a motion to 
enlarge the time for such filing.  Counsel shall timely send a copy of this order to Wright. 
  In 
addition, we certify that the issues presented lack legal merit and that counsel is not 
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required to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court.  3d Cir. L.A.R. 
109.2(b). 
